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RATIONALIZABILITY,  LEARNING,  AND  EQUILIBRIUM  IN 
GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES 
BY PAUL  MILGROM AND JOHN ROBERTS1 
We  study  a  rich  class  of  noncooperative  games  that  includes  models  of  oligopoly 
competition,  macroeconomic  coordination  failures,  arms races,  bank  runs,  technology 
adoption  and  diffusion,  R&D  competition,  pretrial bargaining, coordination  in  teams, 
and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated 
equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models 
of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response  dynamics and 
Bayesian  learning,  the  players' choices  lie  eventually  within  the  same  bounds.  These 
bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters. 
KEYWORDS:  Game theory, supermodular games, iterated dominance,  learning, strate- 
gic complements. 
WE  STUDY  THE  CLASS of (noncooperative)  supermodular  games introduced  by 
Topkis  (1979) and further  analyzed  by Vives (1985, 1989),  who also pointed out 
the  importance  of  these  games  in industrial economics.  Supermodular games 
are games in which each player's  strategy  set is partially  ordered,  the marginal 
returns to  increasing one's strategy rise with increases in the  competitors' 
strategies (so that the game exhibits "strategic  complementarity"2)  and, if a 
player's  strategies  are multidimensional,  the marginal  returns  to any one com- 
ponent of the player's  strategy  rise with increases  in the other components.  This 
class turns  out to encompass  many  of the most important  economic  applications 
of noncooperative  game theory. 
In macroeconomics,  Diamond's (1982) search model and Bryant's (1983, 
1984)  rational  expectations  models can be represented  as supermodular  games. 
In each of these models, more activity  by some members  of the economy  raises 
the returns  to increased  levels of activity  by others. In oligopoly  theory, some 
models  of Bertrand  oligopoly  with differentiated  products  qualify  as supermodu- 
lar games. In these games, when a firm's competitors  raise their prices, the 
marginal  profitability  of the firm's  own price increase  rises.  A similar  structure  is 
present  in games  of new technology  adoption  such as those of Dybvig  and Spatt 
(1983), Farrell and Saloner (1986), and Katz and Shapiro  (1986). When more 
users hook into a  communication  system or more manufacturers  adopt an 
interface  standard,  the marginal  return  to others of doing the same often rises. 
Similarly,  in some specifications  of the bank  runs  model introduced  by Diamond 
and Dybvig  (1983),  when more depositors  withdraw  their funds  from  a bank,  it is 
more worthwhile  for other depositors  to do the same. In the warrant  exercise 
1We  thank  Michihiro  Kandori,  Andrew  Postlewaite,  Tim  Bresnahan,  Chris  Shannon,  and 
especially Don  Brown for helpful conversations, the anonymous referees  and an editor for helpful 
criticisms, and the NSF for financial support. 
2 This  term  "strategic complements"  was  introduced  by Bulow,  Geanakoplos,  and  Klemperer 
(1985) to refer to games in which the best-response functions of the players are upward sloping. See 
also Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). 
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model of Spatt and Sterbenz  (1988), where the firm uses the proceeds of any 
exercised warrant to  issue a special dividend to shareholders,  the marginal 
return to exercising  a warrant increases as other warrant  holders choose to 
exercise. In the arm's  race game modeled in Section 4, the marginal  return  to 
additional  arms in any period is an increasing  function of the foe's armament 
level in the same period and, moreover  (given a convex cost of building  new 
armaments),  higher levels of  armaments  for one country in one period are 
complementary  to higher  levels for it in adjacent  periods.3 
Bayesian  games provide  another  area of application.  An example  is Shavell's 
(1989) model of pretrial  negotiations,  in which the plaintiff  decides whether to 
reveal its expected damages  (its "type")  before the trial begins and the defen- 
dant decides how much  to offer as a settlement  to silent plaintiffs.  In that game, 
a strategy  for the plaintiff  is characterized  by a single number-the  highest  level 
of expected damages  for which the plaintiff  remains  silent-and  a strategy  for 
the defendant is the settlement offer to make to a silent plaintiff.  It is more 
profitable for the plaintiff to  adopt a  "high" strategy when the settlement 
offered to silent plaintiffs  is high, and it is more profitable  for the defendant  to 
make a high settlement offer when plaintiffs  adopt a high strategy  (because a 
higher  offer is then more likely to deter a lawsuit).  So, this too is a supermodu- 
lar game. 
The Shavell example  is a Bayesian  game in which supermodularity  relies on 
the particular  structure  of the specification  of uncertainty.  Vives (1989) has 
shown that any Bayesian  game derived from a parameterized  family  of super- 
modular  games by adding  uncertainty  and private  information  about the payoff 
parameters  is itself a supermodular  game. As examples,  the Diamond search 
model is still supermodular  when there is uncertainty  and private information 
about search  costs and the arms  race is still a supermodular  game when there is 
uncertainty  and private  information  about the cost or effectiveness  of weapons. 
The ordering  of the strategy  space is an important  element in the formulation 
of  supermodular  games, just as  it  is  in  the  formulation of  supermodular 
optimization  models (Granot  and Veinott (1985), Milgrom  and Roberts  (1989)). 
For example, the  multiperiod arms race game is  supermodular  when the 
strategic  choices are ordered  by the stock of arms  held in each period (with the 
componentwise  order), but not when it is ordered by the periodic level of 
investment  in new armaments.  As a second example, Vives (1989) has shown 
that Cournot duopoly games with a wide range of  demand functions4 and 
arbitrary  continuous  cost functions  are supermodular  games if one of the two 
players'  strategy  sets is given the reverse of its usual order, but not with the 
standard  order. As we show, a similar  trick applies to the Hendricks-Kovenock 
3Although  we know of no game models in development  economics,  it would be reasonable  to 
model Scitovsky's  (1954) tale of the railroad  and the steel companies,  in which the value of an 
additional  steel plant in a developing  country  depends  (positively)  on the investment  in railroads 
and the value of additional  investment  in railroads  increases  with the level of investment  in steel 
plants,  as a supermodular  game. 
4Specifically,  these are the demand functions  for which an increase in one player's  quantity 
reduces  the other's  marginal  revenue. SUPERMODULAR  GAMES  1257 
(1989) oil exploration externality  game-a  Bayesian game in which the in- 
creased likelihood of early exploratory  drilling activity  by one firm makes it 
more profitable  for the other to postpone drilling  to await  the first  firm's  results 
before deciding  on its own drilling  program.  Only if the strategies  are ordered 
so that more frequent drilling is a "higher"  strategy  for one player and less 
frequent  drilling  is a higher  strategy  for the other is the game supermodular. 
Additional applications  of the theory are possible once we recognize that, 
although  supermodularity  itself is a cardinal  concept, our analysis  of supermod- 
ular games is entirely ordinal in character,  that is, it uses only inequalities 
among  payoffs  to pure strategy  profiles.  For example,  Reinganum's  (1981)  R &  D 
competition  game, in which firms  race to be the first  to patent an innovation,  is 
not a supermodular  game, but the corresponding  game in which the payoffs  are 
replaced  by their logarithms  is supermodular.  Consequently,  all of our conclu- 
sions about supermodular  games  will apply  to Reinganum's  game. In Section 4, 
we use a similar  trick  to show Bertrand  oligopoly  games are log-supermodular  if 
each firm's elasticity of demand is a decreasing function of its competitors' 
prices. The class of demand  functions  satisfying  this restriction  includes linear, 
logit, CES, and translog  demand  specifications,  and others.  Additional  examples 
of supermodular  games are reported by Cooper and John (1988), Lippman, 
Mamer,  and McCardle  (1987), Sobel (1989), Topkis  (1979), and Vives (1989). 
The centerpiece of our analysis  is Theorem 5. It establishes  that the set of 
serially undominated strategy  profiles, that is, those that remain after an iterative 
procedure  of crossing out strongly  dominated strategies,  has a maximum  and 
minimum  element, and that these elements are Nash equilibria.  It is well known 
that all the major  approaches  to noncooperative  equilibrium  predict outcomes 
in the serially  undominated  set; the set includes  all the pure and mixed  strategy 
Nash equilibria,  all the correlated  equilibria  (both subjective  and objective;  see 
Aumann  (1987)), and all the rationalizable  strategies  (Bernheim  (1985), Pearce 
(1985)). Since pure strategy Nash equilibria are also solutions under these 
various  concepts,  it follows that all of these approaches  predict  the same upper 
and lower  bounds  on the joint behavior  of players  in supermodular  games.  If the 
game is symmetric,  then the bounds on the set of serially  undominated  strate- 
gies  are symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria, so  the  bounds on joint 
behavior  predicted by this symmetric  equilibrium  concept coincide with those 
predicted  by all the other (possibly  asymmetric)  solution concepts. 
An alternative  approach  to solution concepts is to treat the set of strategies 
that are played infinitely often  in  some dynamic adjustment process as  a 
solution. For a very wide class of such processes-a  class we call adaptive 
dynamics  and that includes best-response dynamics,  fictitious play, Bayesian 
learning, and many others-we  show that the bounds on the solution set in 
supermodular  games are always  the same Nash equilibria  that bound  the serially 
undominated set. Then, the  predicted bounds on  eventual behavior under 
adaptive  dynamic  theories coincide with the predicted  bounds of all the other 
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The usefulness  of Theorem  5 depends  partly  on how wide the bounds  are that 
we obtain. Indeed, for some games, these bounds are so wide that our result is 
of little help: it is even possible that the maximum  and minimum  elements of 
the strategy  space are equilibria.  In that case, none of the theories impose any 
tight bounds  on joint behavior.  However,  for other games, the bounds are quite 
narrow.  For example,  in the applications  section,  we show that there can be only 
one symmetric  pure strategy  Nash equilibrium  in the arms  race game described 
in Section 4  and only one  pure strategy Nash equilibrium  in the (possibly 
asymmetric)  Bertrand  pricing  games with linear, logit, or CES demand.  It then 
follows that these games possess no other equilibria  (whether symmetric  or 
asymmetric,  mixed or pure, Nash or correlated),  that each player has only one 
rationalizable  strategy,  and that any adaptive  dynamic  process  leads to behavior 
that converges  from any starting  point to the unique equilibrium. 
In economic modelling, the  analyst is  usually interested not only in the 
existence,  range,  and stability  of equilibria  and the comparisons  among  different 
solution  concepts covered  by the cited theorems,  but also in comparative  statics 
and in the welfare properties  of the equilibria.  We offer two theorems  to aid in 
analyses  of this sort. The first (Theorem  6) provides  a useful general condition 
under which the bounds of  the equilibrium  set vary monotonically  with an 
exogenous  parameter.  The second (Theorem  7) is a welfare theorem.  One of its 
implications  is that there is a Pareto-best  and a Pareto-worst  equilibrium  if each 
player's  payoff is a nondecreasing  function of the others' strategy  choices. For 
example,  in the Bertrand  pricing  game, all firms  prefer the equilibrium  with the 
highest prices and in the macroeconomic  games, all parties prefer the equilib- 
rium with the highest level of economic activity.  Another implication  is that if 
some players' payoffs are increasing and some are decreasing in the others' 
strategies,  then there is a fundamental  conflict among the players:  the equilib- 
rium with the highest payoff for one group is the equilibrium  with the lowest 
payoff  for the other. For example,  in the Cournot  duopoly  game the equilibrium 
with the highest  payoff  for one firm  is the one in which its output is highest  and 
its competitor's  output (and payoff) is lowest. A similar result obtains in the 
Hendricks-Kovenock  drilling game. In that game, a firm that drills an early 
exploratory  well supplies free information  to the other firm,  so the equilibrium 
with the highest payoff for firm 2  and the lowest payoff for firm 1 is the 
equilibrium  in which firm 1 drills early most often and firm 2 drills early least 
often. Also, in the technology adoption game, the equilibrium  with the most 
extensive  adoptions  of the new technology  is the equilibrium  most preferred  by 
players who were ill-served by the older technology and least preferred by 
players  who were well served  by it. 
Our analysis of  supermodular  games also unearths a subsidiary  result of 
independent  mathematical  interest.  With Theorems  1 and 2, we establish  that a 
bounded, order upper semi-continuous,  supermodular  function on a complete 
lattice has a maximum  and that the set of maximizers  is a complete sublattice. 
These theorems  are essential ingredients  in the proof of Theorem  5. SUPERMODULAR  GAMES  1259 
A number of other papers have developed results related to ours. Topkis 
(1979) showed that continuous, supermodular  games with finite-dimensional, 
compact intervals  for strategy  spaces have increasing  best-response  functions5 
and used this result to establish  the existence  of pure strategy  Nash equilibrium 
points for these games. He showed that the set of such equilibrium  points has 
largest and smallest  elements and also provided  a computational  algorithm  for 
finding  these. Lippman,  Mamer, and McCardle  (1987) and Sobel (1989) have 
established  comparative  statics theorems,  showing  the existence of a monotone 
selection from the equilibrium  set as certain parameters  are varied.6  Cooper 
and John (1988) proved a version of the welfare theorem for supermodular 
games in an analysis  of models of macroeconomic  coordination  failures.  Moulin 
(1984) and Bernheim  (1984) studied the relationship  between dominance  solv- 
ability and best-response stability of equilibrium  in a class of smooth games 
including  Cournot  games.  Vives (1989) employs  results  of Hirsch  (1982, 1985)  to 
show that a kind of continuous  adjustment  process converges  to an equilibrium 
for "strictly"  supermodular  games played  on convex  domains.  Independently  of 
our work, Gul (1988) has shown for general finite games that there is a large 
class of adaptive  learning  models for which the long-run  behavior  of the players 
lies entirely in the class of rationalizable  strategies. Besides these theoretical 
contributions,  many  of the applications  papers  developed  their particular  results 
using arguments  that have proven to be generalizable.  Our analysis adds to 
these predecessors  by weakening  slightly  the definition  of supermodular  games, 
contributing  many new examples, encompassing  log-supermodular  and other 
ordinally transformed  supermodular  games within the theory, extending the 
analysis  from pure Nash equilibria  to include mixed,  correlated,  and rationaliz- 
able strategies,  and introducing  a comprehensive  theory of adaptive dynamics 
applicable  to this class of games. 
The remainder  of this paper is organized  as follows. Section 1 presents the 
mathematical  preliminaries.  It begins  with the basic definitions  of lattice theory 
and then reports some previously  known results in the theory and our new 
results. Section 2 presents the basic theory of supermodular  games, including 
the main theorem on  the  existence of  equilibrium  and the  equivalence of 
equilibrium  concepts and the theorems on comparative  statics and welfare. 
Section 3 introduces  the model of adaptive  behavior  for games in general and 
identifies its  implications for  supermodular  games in  particular. Section 4 
provides  detailed analyses  of five examples  of supermodular  games that apply 
and develop  our various  results.  Concluding  remarks  are presented  in Section  5. 
5 More precisely, he  showed that the best response correspondence  has values which are 
nonempty  compact sublattices,  so that there is always a largest and smallest best response. In 
addition,  he showed  that these largest  and smallest  best response  functions  are nondecreasing. 
6 Lippman, Mamer, and McCardle treat the case of  games with monotone best response 
functions while Sobel treats the more general case of monotone best response correspondences, 
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Readers primarily  interested in  applications using the  Nash equilibrium 
concept may skip the mathematical  preliminaries  and begin with Section 2, 
which includes  a characterization  of what might  be termed  the class of "smooth 
supermodular  games"  (including  most of the applications  that we have identi- 
fied) and also presents  the main theorem.  They may then continue  with Section 
3, which analyzes adaptive behavior, and Section 4, which illustrates  various 
applications. 
1.  MATHEMATICAL  PRELIMINARIES 
Consider a set  S  with a partial order  >  that is transitive,  reflexive, and 
antisymmetric.7  Given T c S, b E S is called an upper bound for T if b > x for 
all x e T; it is the supremum  of T (denoted sup  (T)) if for all upper  bounds b of 
T, b > b. Lower bounds and infimums  are defined analogously.  A point x is a 
maximal  element of S if there is no y E S such that y > x (that is, no y such 
that y > x but not x > y); it is the largest  element of S if x > y for all y E S. 
Minimal and smallest elements are defined similarly.  A  set may have many 
maximal  and minimal  elements,  but it can have at most one largest  element and 
one smallest  element. 
The set S is a lattice if for each two point set {x, y} c S, there is a supremum 
for {x, y} (denoted x v y  and called the join of  x  and y)  and an infimum 
(denoted x A y and called the meet of x and y) in S. The lattice is complete  if 
for all nonempty  subsets T c S, inf(T) E S and sup  (T) E S. An interual  is a set 
of the form [x, y]  {zly >z  >x}. 
The real line (with  the usual  order)  is a lattice and any  compact  subset  of it is, 
in fact, a complete lattice, as is any set in  91  n  formed as the product of  n 
compact  sets (with  the product  order).  The interval  (0, 1) is a lattice which  is not 
complete,  while {(x1,  x2) E 9121x1  +x2 <  1) is a simple example  of a set which  is 
not a lattice. 
A sublattice  T of a lattice S is a subset  of S that is closed under A  and V. A 
complete  sublattice  T is a sublattice such that the infimum  and supremum  of 
every  subset  of T is in T. A subset  that is a lattice or complete lattice in its own 
right  may not be a sublattice  or complete sublattice  of a larger  lattice, because 
the relevant sup's and inf's are defined relative to the original,  larger lattice. 
Thus, the set T = [0, 1) U {2} is a complete lattice under the usual ordering;  the 
least upper bound in T for the set [0,  1) is 2 E T. However,  T is not a complete 
sublattice of [0,2] because then sup  [0,  1) = 1 ?  T. Similarly,  under the usual 
ordering on  912,  the  set  T = {(0,  0),  (1,0), (0, 1),  (2,2))  is  a  lattice but not a 
sublattice  of  912 because (1, 0) v (0, 1) = (1, 1) ?  T. 
A  chain C c S is a totally ordered subset of S, that is, for any x E C and 
y E C, x > y or y > x. Given a complete  lattice S, a function f:  S -> 9  is order 
continuous if it converges along every chain C (in both the increasing and 
7Recall  that transitive means that  x > y  and  y > z  imply x > z;  reflexive means that x > x; and 
antisymmetric means that x > y and y > x  implies  x = y. SUPERMODULAR  GAMES  1261 
decreasing  directions),8 that  is,  if  limxE  ,  x  inf(C)  f(x)  = f(inf  (C))  and 
limxe  C, x T sup(C)  f(x)  = f(sup (C)).  It  is  order  upper  semi-continuous  if 
lrm  supx  E c, x  inf(C) f(x)  < f(inf (C))  and lim  sup,Ec,  x T  sup(c)  f(x)  < f(sup (C)). 
A function f:  S --  91 is supermodular if for all x, y E S, 
(1)  f(x)  +f(y)  <f(x  Ay)  +f(x  vy). 
Supermodularity  represents  the economic  notion of complementary  inputs.  The 
theory  of supermodular  optimization  has been developed  by Topkis  (1978) and 
Granot and Veinott (1985). The following  result characterizes  supermodularity 
in differential  terms for the case of smooth functions  with Euclidean  domains. 
The standard  order on such domains  is the "product  order"  according  to which 
x >y  iff xi >yi  for all i. 
ToPKIS'S  CHARACTERIZATION  THEOREM:  Let I = [x,  x] be an interval in  91  n. 
Suppose that f:  9  n  -,  9  is  twice continuously differentiable on  some  open set 
containing I. Then f  is supermodular on I if and only if for all x E I and all i  1j, 
d2f/xi  &x  j > 0. (There  are no restrictions  on d2fl(dXi)2.) 
In general,  supermodularity,  like all the concepts in this theory,  uses only the 
order structure  of the lattice. It entails no assumptions  of convexity  or even 
connectedness  of the domain, nor does it require any convexity,  concavity,  or 
differentiability  of the function itself. However, in view of the theorem, it is 
particularly  easy to check whether smooth functions  on Euclidean  intervals  are 
supermodular.9 
Given two lattices S,  and S2, a  function f:  Sl XS2  i  9  has  increasing 
differences  in  its  two arguments x  and  y  if  for all  x > x',  the  difference 
f(x,  y) -f(x',  y) is nondecreasing  in y.10  In the game model that follows,  if x is 
interpreted  as one player's  strategy,  y as the other's, and f  as the first player's 
payoff,  then the assumption  of increasing  differences  is essentially  the assump- 
tion of strategic  complementarity:  When the second player  increases  his choice 
variable(s),  it becomes more profitable  for the first to increase  his as well. 
Some basic results  for functions  on lattices that we shall need are as follows, 
TARSKI'S  FIXED  POINT  THEOREM:  If  T is a complete lattice and f:  T -*  T is a 
nondecreasing  function,  then f has a fixed point.  Moreover, the set of fixed points 
8 The definition of order continuity is traditionally given in the stricter form that f  must converge 
along  all  convergent  nets,  rather  than  just  along  chains  (cf.  Birkhoff  (1967)).  Our  "weaker" 
requirement is actually equivalent to convergence along nets when the domain of the function is a 
complete  lattice.  Similarly, it can be  shown that a lattice  is complete  if every chain (rather than 
every nonempty set) has a supremum and an infimum in the lattice. 
9 In Milgrom and Roberts (1989), we have weakened the hypotheses of Topkis's Characterization 
Theorem  as  follows.  The  assumption  that  the  domain  of  f  is  an  interval  is  replaced  by  the 
assumption  that  it  is  a  path-connected  sublattice  of  9 '  and  the  assumption  that  f  is  twice 
continuously differentiable is replaced by the assumption that, for each two arguments xi  and xj, f 
can be  expressed as the  indefinite integral of over these  arguments of some  nonnegative  function 
fij.  These  small extensions have proved to be important for certain applications. 
10  Note that this is equivalent to the condition that f(x,  y) -f(x,  y') is nondecreasing in x  for all 
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off  has sup{x E Tlf(x)  >x}  as its largest element and inf{x E Tlf(x)  Ax}  as its 
smallest element. 
ToPKIS'S  MONOTONICITY  THEOREM:  Let  S1 be a  lattice and  S2  a partially 
ordered  set. Suppose  f(x,  y): S, x S2 -_  9i  is supermodular  in x for given y and has 
increasing  differences in  x  and  y.  Suppose  that  y > y'  and  that  x E M 
argmaxf(x,y)  andx'  eM'  argmaxf(x,y').  Then  x Ax'  eM'  andx  Vx'  EM. 
In particular (when y = y'), the set of maximizers of f is a sublattice. 
Some new results in the theory of optimization on lattices will be needed  in 
the analysis below: 
THEOREM  1:  If f  is an  order upper semi-continuous, supermodular function 
from a complete lattice S to 91  u  {  -  oo), then f has a maximum on S. 
PROOF:  Shannon (1989) has shown that the  hypotheses  of Theorem  1 imply 
that f  has a finite least upper bound, which we may take to be zero. We show 
here that there exists y E  S such that f(y)  = 0. 
Let {xj}  be a sequence with the property that f(x,)  >  -  2 -.  Define 
(2)  Ynm  =Xn  A  *  A  *  n+m' 
Since  Ynm is  decreasing  in  m  and  S  is  complete,  the  sequence  has  a  limit 
Yn  E=  S. By order upper semi-continuity, lim supm  f(ynm)  f(yn). 
We  claim that  f(ynm)>  -(2  -n+  ...  +2  (n?m)).  Indeed,  it  is  evident  that 
f(Yn0)  = f(xn)  >  -2n,  and we proceed inductively: 
(3)  f(Ynm)  f(  Yn,m-l  AXn+m) 
>f(Yn,m-l)  +f(Xn+m)  f(Yn,m-i  VXn+m) 
>  - (2 -n  +- *  *  +2 -(n+m-1))  2-(n+m)  - 
0, 
where we have used the definition of  Ynm, supermodularity, and the fact that f 
is  bounded  above  by  zero.  By  order  upper  semi-continuity,  f(yn)  > 
lim supm f(Ynm)  >  -21. 
Observe that  Yn = infm  > n XmI  so  it is increasing in  n.  Hence,  because  S  is 
complete,  {Yn)  has  a  sup  in  S,  namely  "  =  lim Yn,  and  0 =  sup f > f(y)  > 
lim sup f(Yn)  >  0, So  y attains the maximum.  Q.E.D. 
The following example, suggested by Michihiro Kandori, shows that it is not 
in general  true that a bounded,  order upper semi-continuous  function from a 
complete  lattice  to  91  has  a  maximum.  Let  S = {(0,0),(1,  1)} U {xIx1 +X2 = 
1, x1, x2 > 0}. Using the component-wise ordering, it is easy to check that S is a 
complete  lattice:  For  any  set  T  containing  two  points  on  the  diagonal  portion, 
sup (T) =  (1, 1) and inf(T)  =  (0,0).  Order-continuity is no help: no chain on  S SUPERMODULAR GAMES  1263 
has more than three elements, so every  function f: S -*> 9  is order-continuous. 
Nevertheless,  if f  is bounded and supermodular,  then it has a maximum.1" 
THEOREM  2:  If f  is  an  order upper semi-continuous, supermodular function 
from  a  complete lattice S  to  1 u  {-  oo}, then the set  of  maximizers of f  is  a 
complete sublattice of S. 
PROOF: Let  T  be  the  set  of  maximizers  of  f,  which by Theorem 1  is 
nonempty.  It follows  from  Topkis's  Monotonicity  Theorem  that T is a sublattice 
of S. 
Let V be an arbitrary  subset of T. It follows by order-continuity  that every 
chain C c T = T n {x Jx  < sup  (V)} has sup  (C) E=  T. Hence, by Zorn's  Lemma,12 
T has a maximal  element x. Since T is a sublattice,  this x must actually  be the 
largest  element in  T  (for if  y E T  and x?y,  then xvVyET  and  EVy>x, 
contradicting  the maximality  of x).  By construction,  sup  (T) -  sup  (V)  E  T c T. 
Similarly,  inf(V) E7  T and hence T is complete.  Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY:  Let S be a complete lattice and suppose  f: S -  u { -  om}  is order 
upper semi-continuous and  supermodular. Then there are  largest and  smallest 
elements of the set of maximizers of f. 
An  especially useful application of  these results arises in  Lp-space. Let 
Lp([O,  1],  gJk)  be  the  set  of  functions f:  [0, 1]  -S  9jjk  such  that  lf II  = 
(f  lf(x)  1P  dx)l/P  <  oo  where  lf(x) I refers to the Euclidean norm. We identify any 
two functions f  and g  such that  If - g  I1  = 0. Let us say that f > g  if {x Ig(x) > 
f(x)}  is a null set. Then the following  results  are well known  (cf. Aliprantis  and 
Burkinshaw (1985)): 
THEOREM  3:  Suppose  1 < p < oo. Then,  the  Lp  norm  is  order-continuous. 
Moreover, any interval [x, y] in Lp is a complete lattice. 
COROLLARY:  Suppose that f:  Lp 
-*  9f u {  -  oo} is an Lp-upper  semi-continuous, 
supermodular  function on an interval [x, yj]. Then  f has a maximum and the set of 
maximizers is a nonempty, complete sublattice of  [x, y]. 
PROOF: Apply  Theorems  1-3.  Q.E.D. 
2. SOLUTIONS OF SUPERMODULAR GAMES 
The objects of our study are games in what we shall call "ordered  normal 
form."  These are described  as follows.  Let N o 0  be the set of players;  N may 
"lFor  example,  the  linear function  g(x1,  x2) =  Xl-  x2  is  not  supermodular with the  specified 
order, and it has no maximum on S. The linear function g(x1, x2) =  x1 + x2 is supermodular, and it 
does have a maximum on  S. 
12 Zorn's Lemma is as follows: If S is a partially ordered set with the property that every chain in 
S  has an upper bound, then  S has a maximal element. 1264  PAUL MILGROM AND JOHN ROBERTS 
be  finite  or  infinite.  Each  player  n e N  has  a  strategy  set  Sn  with  typical 
element  xn;  the competitors' strategies are denoted  by x-n  and a full strategy 
profile  is  denoted  by  x = (xW, x-d)  E S.  Elements  of  S  are  called  strategy 
profiles. Each strategy set Sn comes with a partial order  >  n, which we will later 
denote  more  simply by  >,  and  the  strategy profiles  are  endowed  with  the 
product order, that is,  x > x'  means  xn >  x I  for all  n E N.  Player n's payoff 
function  is  fn(x,  X-d).  The  object  F =  {N, (Sn, fn, n E N),  > } is  a  game  in 
ordered normal form.  The  game F  is a  supermodular game  if, for each  n E N: 
(Al)  S,, is a complete  lattice; 
(A2)  fn: S --  Ju  {  -  oo} is order upper semi-continuous  in  xn (for fixed x-n) 
and order continuous in x-n  (for fixed xn) and has a finite upper bound; 
(A3)  fn is supermodular in xn (for fixed xd); 
(A4)  fn  has increasing differences in xn and x-n. 
For many games of interest, the conditions of supermodularity can be easily, 
checked using Theorem 4 below. Thus, suppose that a typical strategy for player 
n is (xnj;  k  =  l,...,  kn) E  Mkn  and that  >  is the usual componentwise ordering. 
THEOREM 4:  Suppose there are finitely many players and  the strategies and 
orders are as  described in the preceding paragraph. Then F  is supermodular if 
(Al')-(A4')  below are satisfied: 
(Al')  Sn is an interval in  9Jjkn,  that is, 
Sn  [Yn Yn] =  {xlyn Ax  1J; 
(A2)  fn  is twice continuously differentiable  on S 
(A3')  fn/dx~nni  dxnj > 0 for all n and all  1 < i <i  < kn; 
(A4')  d2fn/dXnidXmj>O  for alln  m,  1 < i < k  and 1 < j < km. 
PROOF:  Immediate from Topkis's Characterization Theorem.  Q.E.D. 
Games satisfying (Al')-(A4')  will be called  smooth supernodular games. 
A  pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy tuple x = (xn; n E N)  such that each  xn 
maximizes ff1w  x_n) over Sn. Any pure Nash equilibrium is (by definition) also 
a mixed  Nash  equilibrium and  a  correlated  equilibrium, although  there  may 
exist mixed equilibria that are not pure and correlated  equilibria that are not 
mixed.  The  sets  of  strategies  Sm  C Sm,  m =  1,...  , N,  are  rationalizable if  for 
each  n and xcSE  ,  x  maximizes E[f(,  xA)]  for some probability distribu- 
tion  on  x-n  with support in  S_n.  A  strategy is rationalizable  if it belongs  to 
some  rationalizable set. The  component  strategies of  a pure Nash  equilibrium 
are all rationalizable; the  rationalizable sets of strategies consist of the single- 
tons defined by the equilibrium point. The pure Nash equilibria are included as 
possible solutions under any of the solution concepts mentioned  above. 
A  pure strategy xn for player n  is said to be  strongly dominated by another 
pure strategy X  if  it  is  the  case  that  for  all  xn,  f(xn, x-)  <f(^n, x-).  A SUPERMODULAR  GAMES  1265 
rational player would  always prefer playing the  dominating strategy xn  to the 
dominated strategy xn. Given a product set S of strategy profiles, we define the 
set  of  n's  undominated  responses  to  SI  by  LXCS)  =  {x'  c  SnI(Vlx e  S=) 
(  E  S)n(  ) >f,(x,,  Let  U(s)  =  (L?(S);  n c  N)  be  the  list  of 
undominated  responses  for  each  player,  and  let  US)  denote  the  interval 
[inf(U(A)), sup(U(A))]. 
We may use  U to represented  the process of iterated elimination of strongly 
dominated strategies, as follows. Define  So = S, the full set of strategy profiles. 
For  r >  1, define  St  = U(S-  1). A  strategy xn  is  serially undominated if  xn E 
UW(S) for all r; these are just the strategies that survive the iterative process of 
crossing  out  strongly  dominated  strategies.  Observe  that  U  is  a  monotone 
nondecreasing  function,  that is, if  S c 5',  then  U(S) c  U(S').  It is well  known 
that only serially undominated strategies can be rationalizable and only serially 
undominated strategies can be played with positive probability at a pure Nash 
equilibrium, mixed Nash equilibrium, or correlated equilibrium. 
In most  treatments,  a strategy xn  for player n  is considered  to be  strongly 
dominated if it is dominated by a pure or mixed strategy, that is, if there exists a 
probability  distribution  over  pure  strategies  for  n  such  that  for  all 
x_n, E[fn(in,  x-A)] >fn(xn,  x-n),  where the expectation is taken with respect to 
the  probability distribution. The  dominance solution of  the  game is the  set  of 
strategies remaining after iterative application of this process and the game is 
called  dominance solvable if the  dominance solution consists of a single point. 
The  dominance  solution,  like  all the  others we  have considered,  contains  the 
Nash equilibrium strategies and is contained in the set of serially undominated 
strategies. 
The following Theorem is the key to the rest of our analysis. 
THEOREM  5:  Let  F  be a supermodular game.  For each player n,  there exist 
largest and smallest serially undominated strategies, Xn and xn.  Moreover,  the 
strategy profiles (xn; n E N)  and (Xn; n E N)  are pure Nash equilibrium  profiles. 
According to the Theorem,  all serially undominated  strategies (and thus all 
rationalizable and equilibrium strategies) lie  in an interval [x, x]  whose  maxi- 
mum and minimum points are the largest and smallest Nash equilibria. We state 
the first step of the proof as a lemma, since it will prove to be useful for later 
developments. (Recall that [x, y] designates the interval of points  > x and  < y.) 
LEMMA 1: Let z, 2 E S be profiles such that z < 2, let Bn(x)  and Bn(x)  denote 
the smallest and largest best responses  for n to any x E S, and let B(x)  and B(x) 
denote the collections Bn(x)  and Bn(x),  n c  N.  Then sup U([z, 2]) = B(z-)  and 
inf U([z, z]) = B(z),  and U([z, z]) = [  B(z),  B(z-)]. 
PROOF OF LEMMA: In view  of Theorems  1 and  2, the  largest  and  smallest  best 
responses  are well  defined. By definition,  B(z)  and  B(z)  are in U([z, 2]),  and 
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pose  zn  Z  BZ)  We  claim  that  zn 4 U[z,  Z] because  Zn  A Zn  strongly 
dominates  zn.  Indeed, for any x E  [z, z], 
(4)  fn(zn,Zn)  fn(n  nAZnIX-n)  -fn(  Zn  -n)  fn(nA  Zn,  -n) 
by (A4) 
< n( Zn V Znl  X-n  )  _fn(  Zn  ' Z-n ) 
by (A3) 
< 0  by definition of  Zn 1 
where the last inequality uses the fact that  Zn  V Zn  >  Zn  Similarly, if Zn W Bn(Z) 
then  Zn  is  strongly dominated  by  znvBn(z).  Then  sup U([z,  ])=B(z)  and 
inf U([z, z]) = B(z),  and consequently U([z, z]) = [  B(z,  B(z))].  Q.E.D. 
PROOF  OF  THEOREM  5:  Let  y? = sup(S)  and  y0 = inf(S)  and,  for  k >  1, 
define  yk  = B(jk-1)  and  yk  = B(yk-1).  We  first show  that  U k(S) c [y, y  k  ] 
Indeed, this is true for k =0;  suppose it is true for k <j.  Then, 
Ui+'(S)cu([  yi  -W)Ca  yj+lji?+1 
where  the  first  containment  follows  from  our  earlier  observation  that  U  is 
monotone  nondecreasing in the set containment order, and the second follows 
from the lemma. These  inclusions also establish that {yk}  is nonincreasing and 
{yk}  is  nondecreasing.  Then,  since  the  strategy  lattice  is  complete,  these 
sequences  have order limits y =  inf yk  and y =  sup  yk  So, the serially undomi- 
nated strategies all lie in the interval [y, 9]. 
We  now  show  that  y  (and  similarly  y)  is  itself  serially  undominated  by 
showing that it is a Nash equilibrium profile. For if it is not, then there  exists 
some n and  xn  such that 
fn(xn,  Y-n)  fn(Yn,  Y-n)  >  0. 
But then, by (A2), 
x  k  ~  k?1  k> 
fn(Xn,Y-n)  fn(Yn  I Y-n)  >0 
for some finite k, contradicting the best response property.  Q.E.D. 
Theorem 5 has several important corollaries. 
COROLLARY:  Assume  (A1)-(A4).  Then there exists a pure Nash  equilibrium. 
Moreover, there exist largest and smallest pure Nash equilibria in the given order. 
COROLLARY:  Assume  (A1)-(A4).  If  the game  F  has  a  unique pure  Nash 
equilibrium, then F  is dominance solvable. 
COROLLARY:  Assume (A1)-(A4)  and suppose, in addition, that the game F  is 
symmetric (unchanged by permutations of the player indexes). If  F  has a unique 
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PROOF:  Since  the  game is symmetric, all players have the  same largest and 
smallest serially undominated strategies and the profiles of largest and smallest 
strategies are, by Theorem 5, pure symmetric Nash equilibria. If the game has 
but one pure symmetric Nash equilibrium, then the largest and smallest serially 
undominated  strategies  for  any  player  must  coincide.  As  we  have  seen  the 
dominance solution is contained in the serially undominated set.  Q.E.D. 
Lippman,  Mamer,  and  McCardle  (1987)  have  established  a  comparative 
statics theorem for an equilibrium selection  from families  of games character- 
ized by increasing best  response  functions  satisfying (A5) below.  We  obtain  a 
related  result, but one  that identifies  particular monotonic  selections,  namely, 
the  maximum  and  minimum  equilibria,  and  that  does  so  for  supermodular 
games, which may have multiple best responses. Sobel (1988) has independently 
provided a version of our result for games with Euclidean strategy spaces. For 
our analysis, let  the  payoff functions be  parameterized by  r  in some  partially 
ordered set  T, so that f,, = fn(x,  x _,  r). Assume: 
(A5)  f,,  has increasing differences in xn and r (for any fixed x_). 
For smooth supermodular games, (A5) is implied by the following condition: 
(A5')  n2faXnid  x2  d > O for all n and i. 
THEOREM  6:  Suppose that  {N,(Sn,fn(xn,x-,r),  n eN),>)  is  a family  of 
supermodular games satisfying (A5).  Then, the smallest and largest serially un- 
dominated strategies xn(&) and in(r)  are nondecreasing  functions of  r. 
PROOF:  Let  B(x,  r)  be  the  largest best  response  function  as defined  in the 
proof of Theorem  4 for the  game with parameter  r.  By Topkis' Monotonicity 
Theorem,  Bn(x_n  r)  is a nondecreasing  function, so  B(x,  r)  is nondecreasing. 
Every  Nash  equilibrium  satisfies  B(x,  r) > x.  By  Tarski's  Theorem,  x(r)  = 
sup {xIB(x, r) >x}  is a fixed point of  B(,,r),  so it is the largest Nash  equilib- 
rium. Since B(x,* ) is nondecreasing, x(*) is nondecreasing. A similar argument 
applies to the smallest equilibrium.  Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY:  Assume  (A1)-(A5).  Then  the  largest  and  smallest  pure  Nash 
equilibria  are nondecreasing  functions of  r. 
Finally, we turn to the welfare theorem mentioned  in the introduction. 
THEOREM  7:  Let xn  and Xn  denote the smallest and largest elements of Sn and 
suppose y and z are two equilibria with y > z.  (1)  If fn(xn, x_n)  is increasing in 
X -  n,  then fn(y)  > fn(z).  (2) If fn( xn, x _ n) is decreasing in x -  n, then fn(y)  < fn(z). 
If the condition in (1) holds for some subset of players N1 and the condition in (2) 
holds for  the remainder N\N1,  then the largest equilibrium is the most preferred 
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while smallest equilibrium  is least preferred by the players in N1 and most preferred 
by the remaining  players. 
Although  the proof is obvious  and the Theorem  involves  additional  conditions 
not implied by the definition of supermodular  games, the Theorem is useful 
because its conditions are satisfied in nearly all of the cited applications.  In 
several of  the  games,  fn(xn,  x-n)  is increasing in  x__  for all the  players, and 
then the largest equilibrium  x- is Pareto-best  and the smallest is Pareto-worst. 
If, in addition,  the game is a smooth supermodular  game and xn is strictly  less 
than the  upper bound of  the  n's  strategy set,  then  even the  Pareto-best 
equilibrium  is not a Pareto optimum.  There are then positive externalities  and 
there is a Pareto-preferred  (but not equilibrium)  strategy  profile in which each 
player adopts a higher strategy.  These observations  are important  for applied 
work, but they are also elementary  to prove, so we do not pause to develop 
them here. 
3.  ADAPTIVE  DYNAMICS 
The problem  of developing  a convincing  learning  theory  to test the "dynamic 
stability"  of equilibrium  in games has attracted  considerable  attention.  Cournot 
(1838) and Edgeworth  (1925), in their classic  studies of oligopoly,  employed  the 
model that we now call "best response dynamics"  (according  to which each 
player in each round expects that his competitors  will do the same thing they 
did at the last round, and optimizes accordingly).  This model, however, is 
unsatisfying,  partly  because it is so arbitrary  in its specificity  about what people 
expect, and partly because it  attributes extreme foolishness to  the players. 
Indeed, the players'  forecasts in this model can be regularly  and predictably 
wrong, and can even lead to cyclic behavior  that the players somehow fail to 
notice. 
An  alternative to  the  best  response model, called "fictitious play," was 
introduced  by Brown  (1951).  Under fictitious  play, the players  attribute  to their 
competitors  mixed strategies with probability  weights that coincide with the 
empirical  distribution  of the past play. Initial results  were promising:  Robinson 
(1951) had proved  that the method always  converges  to an equilibrium  for two 
player,  zero-sum,  finite strategy  games. However,  this line of research  atrophied 
after Shapley (1964) established that fictitious play can lead to  an infinite 
pattern  of cycling  behavior  for two player,  finite strategy,  general sum games. 
Research in adaptive  learning  in games continues.  Recently, Fudenberg  and 
Kreps (1988) have investigated  limiting  behavior  in a class of learning  models 
for general extensive  form games. The behavior  they consider  is broad enough 
to encompass  Bayesian  learning  (regarded  by some as the paradigm  of rational 
learning).  They conclude  that learning  may, even in the long-run,  yield a larger 
set of strategies  than is identified  by Nash equilibrium. 
Shapley and Fudenberg-Kreps  establish the rather negative conclusion  that 
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games.  For supermodular  games,  however,  sharper  and more positive  results  are 
possible. To study this matter, let {x(t)}, x(t) E S, t E T, denote a "learning 
process."  We are deliberately  vague about whether  the time index t is discrete 
or continuous;  our theory  applies to both cases. 
We require  one bit of notation.  Given a process  {x(t)}, let P(T, t) denote the 
strategies played between times T and t: P(T, t) = {x(s)I T < s < t}. 
(A6)  A process {x(t)} is one of  adaptive  dynamics  if (VT)(3 T'XVt> T') 
x(t)  E U([inf(P(T,  t)), sup (P(T,  t))]). 
Condition  (A6) defines a very broad class because it imposes such a weak 
restriction  on the players'  choices. It requires  only that, for any date T, there is 
a later date after which each player  selects either a strategy  that is "justifiable" 
in terms of the competitors'  play since T or, failing that, at least is in the 
interval defined by the set of such justifiable  choices. Thus, for example, in 
continuous  time with isolated serially  undominated  points, the player's  choices 
might  traverse  a path between two of these, and still be justified.  Here, "justify" 
is used in a very weak sense. A strategy  choice is justified  if there is no other 
strategy  that would have done better against every  combination  of strategies  in 
the smallest  interval  containing  the competitors'  recent past play. For example, 
in a three firm Bertrand  game, if firms  two and three have set price combina- 
tions (P2, p3)  of (2,5) and (3,4) in the past, then firm  one can justify  any choice 
which is a best response to some probability  distribution  over the interval  of 
price pairs [2,3] x [4,5] = [(2,4),  (3,5)].  Nevertheless, we  have the  following 
theorem. 
THEOREM  8:  Let {x(t)}  be an adaptive dynamic process and let x = inf(S)  and 
x = sup (S).  Then for every supermodular  game F, 
(Vk)  (3Tk)  (Vt  >  Tk)x(t)  E  B()  kx) 
where Bk(x)  = B(Bk  -(x)),  and similarly  for Bk(x).13 
PROOF:  The conclusion holds trivially  for k = 0. Suppose it holds also for 
k = j -  1. Note  that  S  is  exactly the  set  of  points  in  S  between  x- and  x,  so 
13 Theorem  8  is  stated  for  time  paths  {x(t)}  and  may often  be  usefully  applied  to  stochastic 
learning models by considering the paths they generate and subsequences of the path. For example, 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1988) study a class of models in which the players conduct an infinite number 
of  experiments  over  time  so  that  their  behavior  does  not  satisfy  the  requirements  of  (A6). 
Nevertheless,  the  stochastic behavior generated  by their model  does  satisfy (A6)  (with probability 
one) when  t is restricted to the subsequence of dates at which no experiments are conducted. The 
conclusion of Theorem 8 and its Corollaries then applies along that subsequence.  In particular, the 
second  corollary then  implies  that  for finite strategy supermodular games with Fudenberg-Kreps 
learning, the  play x(t)  almost surely lies  eventually in the  interval bounded  by the  smallest  and 
largest Nash equilibria, except at those isolated dates when players are conducting experiments. 
Applying a model like the Fudenberg and Kreps model to normal form games, we find that the 
resulting behavior satisfies (A6)  along subsequences  even  in models  in which  the  players do  not 
know their competitors' payoffs or strategy sets or even how many other players there may be, but 
simply experiment by choosing strategies and pick the one  that does  best on average. For a fuller 
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S =  [x, x].  By the inductive hypothesis, for t > T1,  x(t) E [B-  1(x), Bi- 1(x)I. 
Applying  (A6) with T = T7  -1 and letting T1  = T', we find that for all t > Tj 
x(t)  E-  U([inf(P(T,t)),  sup(P(T,t))])  c  U[i1x,ilx] 
=  [:gj(!),  Rimx], 
where the last step follows  from Lemma  1.  Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY:  Let  {x(t)}  be an adaptive dynamic process for  a supermodular 
game  F  and  let y  and y  be the smallest and  largest Nash  equilibrium strategy 
profiles of  F.  Then, lim inf x(t)  > y and lim sup x(t)  < y. 
COROLLARY:  For any adaptive process {x(t)}  and any finite strategy supermod- 
ular game, there exists a date after which x(t)  is bounded above and below by the 
largest and smallest Nash equilibrium  strategy  profiles. 
4.  EXAMPLES  OF SUPERMODULAR  GAMES 
We offer five examples  to illustrate  various issues in applying  the theory of 
supermodular  games.  The first,  a Diamond-type  search  model, demonstrates  the 
standard  procedure  for checking  supermodularity  in smooth,  finite player  games 
with real-valued  strategies.  The second, a Bertrand  model, shows how ordinal 
transforms  of the payoff  function  can be used to extend  the range  of application 
of  the theorems. Example 3  illustrates the application of  the theory to  an 
infinite  dimensional  strategy  space arising  in the context of an arm's  race. The 
fourth example  uses the Hendricks-Kovenock  model of oil drilling  to illustrate 
the handling  of uncertainty  and private  information.  Our final example  is based 
on the Milgrom-Roberts  theory  of modern  manufacturing.  It illustrates  the use 
of supermodular  games to study  coordination  failures  among  a group of people 
who share a common  goal (a "team"). 
(1) A  Diamond-type Search Model. There  are a finite number of  players  N 
who exert effort searching for trading partners. Any trader's probability  of 
finding  another  particular  trader  is proportional  to his own effort and the total 
effort of the others. Let x(n) E [0, X] denote the effort of player n. Then, the 
payoff  to player  n is defined  by: 
fn( x) = arx(  n)  E  x( m) -C(  x(n))  . 
m  9n 
Since  d2f"/dx(n)dx(m)  = a > 0  (for  m #  n),  this  is  a  supermodular  game. 
Suppose  that C( ) is increasing.  Then x(n)  0 is an equilibrium.  If C( ) is also 
smooth  and convex,  then for each E satisfying  a(N -  1)E  = C'(E),  there is also a 
symmetric  equilibrium  in which each searcher selects effort level  e.  These 
equilibria  are Pareto  ranked,  as our welfare  theorem  indicates.  As our compara- 
tive statics  theorem  indicates,  the upper  bound on the equilibrium  search  effort 
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(2)  Bertrand Oligopoly with Differentiated Products. Some Bertrand oligopoly 
games can be analyzed  as supermodular  games.  For example,  Topkis  (1979)  has 
shown  that if the goods are substitutes  with linear demand  and costs and if the 
players'  strategies are prices constrained  to lie in an interval  [0, p], then the 
game is supermodular.14 
The domain  of the theory  can be considerably  expanded,  however,  by consid- 
ering monotone transformations  of the payoff  function.  An important  example 
is the case in which  each firm n produces  with constant  unit costs cn and faces a 
demand  function Dn(p) with the properties  that the goods are substitutes  and 
that the elasticity of demand is a nonincreasing  function of the other firms' 
prices. Mathematically,  this second condition is equivalent to requiring  that 
d2  log(Dn)/dpn dpm  > 0 for n # m. This form of demand encompasses  the logit 
(Dn = kn/EjEN  kj exp [A(p ps)],  A < 0),  CES  (Dn = YP/-  l E  NE  Pj  where 
r <  O),15 and  transcendental  logarithmic"6 (log (Dn) =  an + Eje  N 137log  (p1)  + 
Eje  EjeNy  j/j]  log(pi)log(pj)  where f3n<O,  n < 0,  Bn  > 0, and ynnj  >  for 
i O  n), as well as all the demand functions that Topkis studied.17  The firm's 
log-profits  are: 
(5)  log  [(pn  -  cn)Dn(p)J  = log(pn  -  C)  +  log  [Dn(p)]. 
For all demand  functions  in this class, if we take the strategies  to be xn =Pn  pE 
[cn p], then (A1')-(A4') are satisfied  and the (log-transformed)  game is super- 
modular. 
In fact, for the cases of linear demand, CES, logit, and translog  with the 
additional parameter restrictions that EjEN N  < 0 and EjE Nynnj < 0, we can do 
even better, establishing  the uniqueness  of the pure strategy  Nash equilibrium. 
We illustrate  for the cases of logit and CES. Let player n's strategy  be xn =Pn 
for the case of logit demand and xn = log(pn) for CES demand, where we 
restrict  Pn  E=  [Cn  P]  (An order-preserving  transformation  of the strategy  spaces 
does not affect supermodularity,  but in this case it simplifies  the analysis of 
uniqueness.)  With these assumptions,  it is routine  to verify  that (A1')-(A4') are 
satisfied,  so the game is supermodular. Letting fn(X) =  log  [(pn - Cn)Dn(p)],  one 
can verify  for logit and CES demand  that for all x: 
( 6)  -a2fn/(ax  )2>  E  d2f/axn  dxj1. 
This is a "dominant  diagonal"  condition and it implies that the transformed 
game has a unique pure strategy equilibrium.  Indeed, if there are multiple 
equilibria,  then since the game is supermodular  there are two, x and x, with 
x  >x  (since there are largest and smallest equilibria).  Let n be the player  for 
14 Vives (1989) extends this analysis to the case of convex costs. Also, Topkis had shown that the 
result  extends  to  the  case  where  the  demand  function  satisfies  the  "increasing  differences" 
condition; however the linear demand function is the only commonly studied one with that property. 
15  See Varian (1978). 
16 See Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau (1973). 
17 For additional examples and a fine treatment of  Bertrand equilibrium in spatial models,  see 
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whom x; - x;  is largest.  Then, 
(7f  0  (X)  d  d  +(1-t)x]_dt.  dxn  9xn  jE0  axndxj 
The assumption  that x and x are equilibria  with xn > xn requires  that dfn/dXn 
be nonnegative  at x and nonpositive  at x, so the left-hand  side of (7) must be 
positive. However, according to  (6),  the  integrand in  (7)  must be  strictly 
negative,  a contradiction.  So, the equilibrium  is unique. 
Since the transformed  game is supermodular  and has a unique equilibrium,  it 
follows from Theorem 5 that each player has only one serially undominated 
strategy.  Since the set of serially  undominated  strategies  is determined  only by 
ordinal  comparisons,  the corresponding  prices are the unique serially  undomi- 
nated strategies  in the original  game, as well. Hence, the original  Bertrand  game 
has a unique equilibrium  and is actually  dominance  solvable, and the equilib- 
rium is globally  stable under any adaptive  learning  rule, that is, any adaptive 
rule satisfying  (A6). Comparative  statics are also transferrable  between the two 
games. For example,  an increase  in any one cost cn results  in an increase  in all 
the firms'  prices  (by Theorem  6) in both the transformed  and original  games. 
(3) Arms Races. The players  are two countries  engaged in an arms race. In 
the static  version  of the game,  each player  chooses a level of arms  xn E [0,  XMax] 
and receives as its payoff fn(Xn, xn)  =  -  C(xn)+  B(xn  -  xn),  where B  is a 
smooth  concave  function  and C is a smooth  function  of any shape. The game is 
assumed  to be symmetric,  so the same payoff  function  applies  to players  1 and 2. 
Since d2f/ldxl dx2 =-B"(x1-  x2)  >  0, this is a supermodular  game. 
One can extend this one-shot game to a dynamic  game in which stocks of 
armaments  accumulate  and depreciate  over time. We use "open loop" strate- 
gies xn,, where xn(t)-the  level of arms at time t-proceeds  according  to the 
dynamic  equation  xn(t)  =  (1 -  5)xn(t  -  1) + In(t). Here 8 is the rate of depreci- 
ation, In(t) is the rate of investment  in armaments  at time t (implied by the 
strategy  xn), and the initial  condition  is xn(-  1)  =  0. Suppose  that the payoffs  in 
the game are the present  value of the advantages  of superior  armaments  minus 
the cost of investment  in armaments  C(In(t)),  as follows: 
00 
(8)  E pt[B(Xn(t)  - X  n(t))  -C(Xn(t)-(-)  Xn(t  -1M) 
t=0 
We now assume  that B is increasing  as well as concave,  that C is increasing  and 
convex,  that p and 8 lie strictly  between zero and one, and that there is some I 
such that xn  is feasible if and only if In(t)  lies in [0, I] for all t. Let xn > kXn 
mean that  xn(t)  xn(t)  for all  t.  Each term in  the  sum (8)  satisfies the 
supermodularity,  increasing  differences,  and continuity  conditions (A2)-(A4). 
Veinott (1989) has shown  that the properties  of supermodularity  and increasing 
differences  are preserved  under summation  and that the pointwise limit of a 
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We verify  (Al)  as follows.  First,  we may regard  the strategy  sets as subsets  of 
the lattice {x 10  A  x(t) < tI}. The constraints  on the strategy  choices are xn(O) =  0 
and I > xn(t) -  (1 -  O)xn(t -  1) > 0, for t = 1,  2  ....  One can directly verify that 
each of these constraints  individually  describes  a complete sublattice.  Further- 
more, it  follows immediately from the  definitions that any intersection of 
complete  sublattices  is a complete sublattice  (and hence a complete  lattice in its 
own right).  So, all the conditions  are satisfied  and the game is supermodular. 
The first order conditions  for optimal  investment  at a symmetric  equilibrium 
require  C'(In*(t))  = B'(O)/[1  -  p(l -  )]  for  all  t,  from  which  the  symmetric 
equilibrium  strategy x *  can be  uniquely inferred. Consequently, the  pure 
symmetric  equilibrium  is unique and the game, despite its infinite dimensional 
strategy space, is  dominance solvable. At  each stage s  in  the  dominance 
elimination  process,  there  is  an  interval  [XS, xS]  containing  x*  such  that  all 
remaining strategies  x  must  satisfy  xS(t)  < x(t) < xS(t)  or  be  strongly domi- 
nated at that stage by the strategy  (x V xs) A xs  which is obtained from x by 
truncating  it to lie within the prescribed  interval.  As s increases,  the strategies 
xS  converge monotonically down to  x* while the strategies  xS converge mono- 
tonically  up to x*, as the proof of Theorem  5 demonstrates. 
The corresponding  continuous  time arms  race game can also be shown  to be 
supermodular  and dominance  solvable.18 
(4)  Drilling  for  Oil. This game is  based on  a  model of  Hendricks and 
Kovenock  (1989). The players  are two oil firms  who own similar  tracts of land 
which may or may not bear oil. Each firm observes a signal sn  (a geological 
report)  at date 0 that provides  information  about  the unknown,  common  value v 
of the tracts;  the signal is modeled as a real-valued  random  variable.  Drilling 
costs are c and the discount  factor is 8. If a firm drills at date t (t = 0, 1), its 
payoff is  8t(v -  c).  If one firm drills at date zero, then the other firm can 
condition  its drilling  decision on the outcome. In that case, if it delays drilling, 
its date 1 payoff  will be max(0,  v -  c). 
We consider a simplified  version of the Hendricks-Kovenock  game in which 
the game ends immediately  with payoffs  of zero if neither firm drills at date 0. 
Let Xn denote the indicator  function  of the set of signals  that trigger  drilling  by 
firm n at date 0. These indicator  functions  describe  the pure strategies  available 
to each firm. We order the two players'  strategy  sets oppositely.  Thus, we say 
that Xn  <  n if  (-nl)  Xn(t) <  (-1)%n,(t)  for almost all t. 
Suppose that the underlying  value v has finite expectation  and that the joint 
density of the value and signals  (V,  s1,  S2) is g(V,  sI , S2). Payoffs  for firm 1 are 
then as follows: 
Jf( v  - c)xl(s) g( v, s, t) dvdsdt 
+ affmax(0,  v -  C)X2(  t)[1  - X1(s)I  g( v, s, t) dvdsdt. 
18 The one extra difficulty in the continuous time game is to establish that the payoff function is 
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The first term is the firm's payoff from immediate drilling;  the second is its 
payoff  from not drilling  in period zero when the second firm  drills. 
Notice that for each fixed value of (v, t, s), the integrand  is a supermodular 
function of  -X1(s)  and X2(t). As Vives (1989) first observed about Bayesian 
games of this sort, it follows that the payoff function is supermodular  in the 
strategies  with the given partial ordering.  Since the payoff function is plainly 
L1-continuous,  Theorem 3 implies that the payoff  functions  are order-continu- 
ous and that the strategy  sets are complete lattices. By our assumption  that 
E[v] is finite, the payoffs are bounded. So this is a supermodular  game. As 
Hendricks and Kovenock have shown, such games can have multiple Nash 
equilibria.  Since firm l's payoff increases in X2  and 2's payoff declines in Xi 
(given  our ordering),  Theorem  7 implies  that the best equilibrium  for firm 1 and 
the worst for firm  2 is the one at which firm  2 drills  most often. 
(5) Modem  Manufacturing.  Our interest in supermodular  games began with 
our research into modern manufacturing  (Milgrom and Roberts (1990)), for 
which we  constructed a  model of  the  firm's technological, organizational, 
product  design, and pricing  decisions.  In that model, we showed that the firm's 
payoff  function  is supermodular. 
We now extend our previous  analysis  to study  the coordination  problem  of a 
"team" of managers  who run the firm and adapt to changing technological 
opportunities.  That the managers  form a team means that they all share the 
same payoff  function f,  which is also the payoff  function  of the firm.  Thus, let 
. ..  ok , T) be a supermodular  function  representing  both the profits  of the 
firm  and the payoff  of each manager  when manager  j selects Oi  from a compact 
interval  I  C 91  m  and when the exogenous  parameter  value is T. It is routine  to 
check that the game played among the managers is a supermodular  game. 
Consequently,  the Corollary  of Theorem  9 (about adaptive  dynamics)  applies  to 
it. Clearly,  the firm's  optimum  is a Nash equilibrium  of the team game. If the 
game has a  unique Nash equilibrium,  then any behavior by the  managers 
consistent  with adaptive  dynamics  will lead the managers'  behavior  to converge 
to the optimum without any explicit coordination  among them. If there are 
multiple  equilibria,  however,  then there can be a coordination  failure in which 
the managers'  adaptive  behavior  fails to converge  toward  the firm's  optimum. 
One can further  enrich the model by incorporating  competition  from other 
firms producing  substitute  goods. For example, suppose that the firm faces a 
linear  demand  function  Qn  =  D(pn, pn),  that x  w  =(ps,w  ...Q9D,  and that 
fn(x,  ) =PnQn-C(Qn,  ,n r),  where  marginal  cost  is  nondecreasing  and 
C(-  Qn,  on,r)  is supermodular. Suppose  that  each  firm is  a  team  of  k + 1 
managers,  of whom one sets the price and the other k choose the Q1's.  If there 
are N firms,  then this N(k + 1)-player  game is supermodular,  and our compara- 
tive statics and adaptive  learning  results (Theorems  6 and 9) apply directly.  In 
our earlier  paper,  we argued  that the firm's  optimum  (p*(r), 0*(X))  was nonde- 
creasing  in r if f  has increasing  differences  in (p, 0) and r. We now see that 
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extended  model  with  competing  oligopolistic  firms, each  run  by  a  team  of 
managers using adaptive learning rules. 
5.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Most attempts to analyze noncooperative  games have focused on developing 
general  solution  concepts  that  could  be  applied  to  all  such  games.  This  ap- 
proach seems  not  always to be  attractive; there  is no  single story that applies 
equally to  all game  situations. Some  games  are played without precedent  and 
among  strangers; players then  must  reason  about  how  their  competitors  will 
play and so  how they themselves  should play from whatever they know about 
the rules of the game and from their general knowledge about human behavior 
and the backgrounds of the other players. Under  these  circumstances, there is 
little  reason  to  suppose  that  the  players will  have correct  expectations  about 
how their competitors  will play, and then  rationalizable  strategies  and corre- 
lated  equilibrium provide attractive alternatives to  the  Nash  equilibrium solu- 
tion concept.  In other situations, the institution being modeled  is a stable one 
that has attracted new participants regularly in the past so that the behavior of 
past participants may be  a good guide to that of the new ones.  If the environ- 
ment were truly stationary, it would be natural to use adaptive learning models 
to predict the kinds of behavior that might emerge. Most often, however, games 
do  have some  precedents,  but not perfect  ones,  so  that some  combination of 
reasoning and observation will be what actually guides the players' choices. The 
class of supermodular games is remarkable and useful because  it is a class that 
includes  so many games  that have been  of greatest  interest  in applied theory 
and for which  all these  alternative "solutions" imply identical  bounds  on  the 
joint behavior of the players. 
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